My initial encounters with critical perspectives on law together with my subsequent experience in law and legal education have led to several observations.
The Need for Attention to the History of Ideas
Although widespread public discourse in America regarding critical perspectives has emerged only in the last decade or so, discourse regarding these perspectives has been underway for some time in higher education, including American law schools. Both those who embrace and those who resist these perspectives need to understand this history. A deeper understanding of this history may help to make discussions of these perspectives less contentious and counter-productive, and more thoughtful and constructive.
The Demise of CLS and the Rise of Other Critical Perspectives on Law
The vitality of CLS had largely dissipated by the mid-1990s. As a movement, it generated more criticism of the existing state of affairs than solutions, and it ultimately offered little in terms of constructive reform. Nevertheless, despite its brief duration as a force in legal thought and legal education, CLS pushed the skepticism of Legal Realism in the direction of a more cynical understanding of law and legal institutions, and its deconstructive and activist program was readily adaptable for use by proponents of other critical perspectives on law (i.e., CRT, FLT, critical latino/a theory, and queer theory). These other critical perspectives on law have grown and filled space vacated by CLS, and these perspectives on law have remained viable forces in American legal thought and education.
The Critical Perspectives on Law and Ideology
Proponents of CLS and other critical perspectives on law have sought to discredit those who believe that objective reality is knowable, that neutral reasoning is possible, that texts have ascertainable meaning, and that judges and lawmakers in their work can engage in objective, neutral reasoning processes. Having impugned objectivity and neutrality in law and legal reasoning, proponents of these perspectives contend that law is inseparable from politics, and their ideological commitments govern how they interpret and explain the past and the present, how they analyze and classify individuals and institutions, and what agendas they seek to advance. Accordingly, these perspectives on law should not be understood to provide ideologically-neutral, analytical frameworks. Rather, they are ideologically-freighted, analytical frameworks. And, as those who were formed in American law schools over the last five decades have graduated and assumed leadership roles throughout American society, many have carried these perspectives and frameworks with them and shared them with others.
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